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In Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group the Illinois Supreme Court-by a 4-3
vote-upheld an arbitration system in which injury victims are bound by awards
below $20,000, but in which insurance companies can insist on a trial de novo for
awards over that amount.' A recent legislative enactment has complicated the
threshold at which awards change from binding to non-binding, by increasing it to
$50,000.2 However, even in cases where a higher threshold applies, those injury
victims receiving awards below the threshold (or losing on the issue of liability)
are bound by the arbitration, while injury victims receiving awards higher than the
threshold can be required to re-litigate their cases de novo in the court system.
This is the arbitration system that awaits Illinois drivers, passengers, and pedestri-
ans who are injured today by uninsured motorists.
In almost all states, when an insurance company sells an automobile insur-
ance policy, the company is required by statute to include in that policy-or, at
least offer to include-what is called "uninsured motorist" coverage. 3 Uninsured
motorist (UM) coverage is intended to protect people who are injured by drivers
with no liability insurance. 4 If an uninsured driver injures a person with UM in-
surance, then the victim's own UM coverage functions in large part as if it were
the liability insurance for the at-fault driver.5
Disputes about whether an injury victim is entitled to UM compensation, and
the amount of compensation, are resolved either by the court system or by arbitra-
tion. In choosing which system to use, the states fall into three categories. First,
about twenty three states prohibit insurance companies from imposing arbitration
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1. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052 (111. 1999) (4-3 decision).
2. In 2003, the Illinois legislature changed the binding/non-binding threshold, by setting it at
$50,000 per person, or the corresponding policy limit for bodily injury or death, whichever is less. 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003); Reed, 720 N.E.2d 1052.
3. ROBERT H. JERRY 11, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 135 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that UM
coverage "is now required or required to be offered by statutes in forty-nine states").
4. ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 1.8 (rev. 2d ed. 2000).
5. Id. The same common law tort principles that would have applied in a suit against the driver
also operate in a UM case. The injury victim must be able to prove that the uninsured driver was
negligent, that the negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, and the extent of damages suffered.
1
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in their UM provisions, 6 and either implicitly or explicitly provide that disputes in
UM cases will be resolved within the state court system. Second, about twenty
four states neither prohibit nor require UM arbitration, although in those states
almost all auto insurance companies impose arbitration under the terms of their
insurance policies.7 Third, three states require that UM disputes be resolved by
8
arbitration.
The states requiring arbitration are Illinois, California, and Massachusetts.9
But unlike the statutes in California and Massachusetts that require binding arbi-
tration, the Illinois statute does something unique: it creates a binding/non-
binding threshold.10 If the arbitration results in an award less than $50,000 per
person, or less than the corresponding policy limit for bodily injury or death, then
the arbitration is binding." While not explicitly stated by the statute, if the arbi-
tration results in an award over the threshold, then the arbitration is not binding.
Thus, injury victims receiving low awards (or a finding of no liability) are bound
by the arbitration, while injury victims receiving awards over the threshold can be
required to re-litigate their cases de novo in the court system. In Reed, the plain-
6. Several states have arbitration acts that specifically exclude insurance contracts: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 5-401(c) (2003); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050(2) (Michie 2004); Mo. REV. STAT. §
435.350 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(c) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(4)
(2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-3 (Michie 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5653(a) (2004). In
several other states, the uninsured motorist statute that requires UM coverage also prohibits arbitration
clauses regarding that coverage: GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11(g) (2004); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §19-
509() (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-109 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1206(c) (2004); VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206H (2004); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(g) (2004). Finally, other states have an
assortment of provisions that effectively prevent mandatory arbitration in UM cases: ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-79-203(a) (Michie 1987) (prohibiting insurance policies from depriving the right to trial by jury
on any question of fact); IOWA CODE § 679A. 1 (2004) (prohibiting arbitration involving contracts of
adhesion or regarding "any claim sounding in tort whether or not involving a breach of contract"); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:680(5) (2004) (allowing an arbitration provision, but making arbitration op-
tional with the insured); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5948 (2003) (specifically prohibiting arbitra-
tion clauses in UM coverage); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3)(a) (2004) (requiring that auto insur-
ance policies contain a provision that the insurance company shall be bound by a final judgment of the
insured against an uninsured motorist, if the insured complies with certain notification requirements);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.7 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 690B.017 (Michie 2004) (making
arbitration provisions in auto insurance non-binding on the persons protected); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
742.504(10) (2003); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.002(a)(3) (Vernon 2005) (prohibiting
arbitration in cases for personal injury). At least one state has case law prohibiting mandatory arbitra-
tion in UM cases. Heisner v. Jones, 169 N.W.2d 606 (Neb. 1979) (holding that an arbitration clause in
uninsured motorist coverage was void as against public policy). See also Stephen Lamson, The Impact
of the Federal Arbitration Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act on Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 19
CONN. L. REV. 241, 248-51 (1987); JERRY, supra note 3, § 84.
7. WtDISS, supra note 4, § 22.2.
8. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West 2004); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 111 D (2003). Prior to 1995, Oregon had a statute that appears to have allowed
either the insurer or insured to unilaterally "elect" arbitration in UM cases. In 1997, the legislature
amended the statute and Oregon now allows arbitration only if the parties mutually agree to it after the
dispute arises. OR. REV. STAT. 742.504(10) (2001). For background on the constitutional problems of
the previous Oregon statute, see Steven M. Zipper, Note, Legislatively Mandated Arbitration in Ore-
gon: The Unconstitutionality of the Uninsured Motorist Arbitration and Personal Injury Protection
Arbitration Statutes, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 737 (1995).
9. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003); CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(f) (West 2004); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 11 D (2003).
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tiff challenged this mechanism, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional and
that the corresponding insurance policy provision was unconscionable and against
public policy.' 2 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's challenges. 13
This article asserts that the Reed decision is bad as a matter of public policy
and that the majority opinion was erroneous on both public policy and constitu-
tional grounds. To set this type of arbitration in its proper context, Part II of this
article will examine how UM coverage helps to accomplish a major objective of
tort law, why UM coverage is important to anyone who could be hurt by a motor
vehicle, and how arbitration became a common method of dispute resolution in
UM cases.
Although Illinois is unique in that it is the only state that has a statute impos-
ing a binding/non-binding threshold, many insurance policies, sold in other states,
articulate this sort of mechanism explicitly in their arbitration provisions.' 4 Be-
cause of the likelihood that a trial de novo provision will benefit insurance com-
panies disproportionately compared to injury victims, many courts have character-
ized it as an "escape clause" or "escape hatch."' 15 Part II will review how other
courts have ruled on the validity of similar "escape clauses."
Part III will then summarize the majority and dissenting opinions in Reed.
Part IV will analyze some of the principal errors made in the majority opinion and
will describe how Reed fits in with the current debate regarding mandatory arbi-
tration in the consumer context. Finally, Part IV urges two sets of remedies:
First, when it next has a proper case before it, the Illinois Supreme Court should
reverse Reed, and hold: (1) that the Illinois statutory provision requiring the es-
cape clause is unconstitutional; and (2) that the Illinois statutory provision requir-
ing arbitration of UM cases is unconstitutional. Second, the Illinois General
Assembly should amend the state's arbitration act or the insurance code (or both),
and enact provisions to prohibit insurance policies from requiring arbitration of
12. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Ill. 1999) (4-3 decision).
13. Id. at 1061.
14. In all other cases examined by the author, up until 2003, the minimum amount of liability cover-
age required by the state's financial responsibility law served as the threshold amount that triggered the
escape mechanism. In 2003, Illinois departed from this approach by setting the threshold at the corre-
sponding policy limit for bodily injury or death, or $50,000 per person, whichever is less. 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003).
15. See Pepin v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21, 22 (R.I. 1988) (characterizing the provision as
an "escape hatch"); Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788, 791 (Del. 1992) (calling the provi-
sion an "escape hatch" and an "escape device in favor of the insurance company"). See also Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 472 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ohio 1984) (6-1 decision) (Sweeney, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the provision allows the insurance company "to have its cake and eat it too").
Black's Law Dictionary defines an escape clause as: "A contractual provision that allows a party to
avoid performance under specified conditions; [specifically], an insurance-policy provision-[usually]
contained in the "other insurance" section of the policy-requiring the insurer to provide coverage
only if no other coverage is available." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (7th ed. 1999). The type of
insurance escape clause described in Black's is critically different from the escape clauses discussed in
this article. An escape clause in an "other insurance" provision, such as Black's describes, may work
no hardship on a person who, in fact, has other insurance to pay for a loss. But the type of escape
clauses discussed herein allow the injury victim's insurance company to escape responsibility for
paying (at least temporarily, by demanding a trial de novo) when there may be no other insurance
available to compensate the victim or pay medical bills. In fact, it is because the at-fault driver has no
insurance that uninsured motorist coverage is so important.
2005]
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insurance disputes, and allow arbitration of insurance disputes only when both
parties knowingly agree to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Tort law, Uninsured Motorist Coverage & Arbitration
1. Tort Law
The law of torts developed principally as a means to redress harm that one
person suffers because of the unreasonable conduct of another. Professor William
Prosser has summarized the law of torts as concerning "the allocation of losses
arising out of human activities .... The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust
these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as
the result of the conduct of another." 16 And, commenting specifically on the role
of damages, Professor Richard Epstein observes that "even if awards cannot make
victims indifferent to the losses, damages can furnish victims with substantial
compensation to help them and their families move forward with their lives."'
17
Thus, if an individual is careless, and that carelessness causes harm to an-
other, the law of torts is a means by which the careless one can be made to pay
money compensation to the victim of the harm. Although the law has no power to
undo certain types of harm, or to prevent their impact on the victim's future, the
law sees compensation as a way to try to counterbalance the harm. Whatever they
may use the money for, the essential justice of money compensation is that it en-
ables the injury victim to try to make his or her life better, to make up for the ways
in which the injury has made their life worse.
This is not a new approach. The idea of paying money to compensate an in-
jury victim has been used since the earliest recorded times. 18 In addition to the
goal of compensating the injury victim, the payment of money damages has also
been seen as a means of promoting social order and maintaining the peace.' 9
2. Uninsured Motorist Coverage
In any industrialized society, one of the most common instrumentalities of in-
jury is the motor vehicle. Compared to the power and forces produced by even
16. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (3d ed. 1964).
17. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 17.1 (1999).
18. Exodus 21:18-19. The ancient document instructs:
If men quarrel and one hits the other with a stone or with his fist and he does not die but is con-
fined to bed, the one who struck the blow will not be held responsible if the other gets up and
walks around outside with his staff; however, he must pay the injured man for the loss of his time
and see that he is completely healed.
Id.
19. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2-3 (1881). Holmes asserted:
It is commonly known that the early forms of legal procedure were grounded in vengeance.
Modem writers have thought that the Roman law started from the blood feud, and all the authori-
ties agree that the German law [began] in that way. The feud led to the composition, at first op-
tional, then compulsory, by which the feud was bought off.
[Vol. I
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the smallest compact car, human strength is puny and insignificant. In the United
States each year, motor vehicles damage or destroy hundreds of thousands of hu-
man lives.20 In Illinois alone, during the calendar year 2003, motor vehicle colli-
sions caused 131,279 injuries,21 and 1454 deaths.22
Given the frequency of automobile collisions, and the fact that the law of torts
places financial responsibility directly on the shoulders of the at-fault driver, most
motorists buy auto insurance to protect themselves from personal liability (and,
indirectly, to compensate those whom they might injure). Although liability in-
surance is frequently available to pay compensatory damages to the victims of
auto collisions, it is not always available. In almost all states, "financial responsi-
bility" laws now require owners to purchase liability insurance for any vehicle
they register in the state. Nevertheless, the financially irresponsible/uninsured
driver remains a major problem. Dean Robert Jerry comments:
The tort liability system does not always work efficiently to reimburse
fully the victims of torts. One weakness of the system is that a person in-
jured by one who lacks either assets to pay a judgment or insurance will
not be compensated for [the] loss. The primary way of remedying this
gap in protection for victims of automobile accidents is uninsured motor-
ist (UM) coverage ....
And, further, Professor Alan Widiss comments:
In the United States the right to be redressed by another person for inju-
ries resulting from an automobile accident has primarily been predicated
on an allocation of fault .... The vast majority of motorists obviate or
transfer at least a portion of this economic risk through the acquisition of
automobile liability insurance. However, there have always been indi-
viduals-the "financially irresponsible"-who neither purchase insur-
ance nor possess sufficient [personal] financial resources to enable them
to respond to such damage claims, thereby creating situations where in-
nocent victims are unable to secure compensation from the person whose
24negligence caused the injuries.
The problem of the "financially irresponsible" driver has prompted almost all
state legislatures to adopt statutes requiring that insurance companies sell (or at
least offer for sale) "uninsured motorist" coverage. 25 Because UM benefits are
20. According to the Federal Highway Administration (FHA), motor vehicle crashes are the leading
cause of death among Americans under 35 years of age. United States Department of Transportation
FHA, Dec. 23, 2004, Facts, Statistics and Data, at http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/facts/index.htm (last
visited May 12, 2005). In 2003, nationwide, 42,643 people died in motor vehicle collisions, and al-
most 3 million were injured. United States Department of Transportation FHA, Dec. 23, 2004, Road
Safety Fact Sheet, at http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/facts/road_factsheet.htm (last visited May 12, 2005).
21. Illinois Department of Transportation, 2000-2003 Illinois Crash Facts and Statistics 1 (2004), at
http://www.dot.state.il.us/trafficsafety/crashdata00.pdf.
22. Id.
23. JERRY, supra note 3, § 135.
24. WIDISS, supra note 4, § 1.1.
25. JERRY, supra note 3, § 135.
2005]
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based upon what the injury victim would have been legally entitled to recover
from the uninsured motorist, the same common law tort principles that would
have applied in a suit against the driver also operate in a UM case.26 Thus, the
injury victim must be able to prove that the uninsured driver was negligent, that
the negligence was a proximate cause of the injury, and the extent of damages
suffered.27
Financial compensation is of obvious importance to the injury victim, but it
also has implications for society at large. In cases involving grievous injury with
high medical expenses, if private insurance is not available to cover the losses, the
cost may ultimately be borne by the taxpayers. If the injury victim's personal
assets are consumed, with substantial amounts still unpaid to doctors and hospi-
tals, and if the injury victim is forced to rely on Medicaid or some other public
program, society at large-and the taxpayer-ultimately pays the bill. From a
public policy viewpoint, considering that the insurance industry is making billions
of dollars selling insurance to consumers-many of whom are forced by state laws
to buy automobile insurance-it is obviously good public policy to require the
insurance industry to help protect responsible motorists by selling them protection
against the losses caused by uninsured drivers. But selling such insurance alone is
not sufficient; the insurance industry must also pay the claims and resolve dis-
puted claims in a fair and even-handed manner.
3. The Origins of Arbitration in the Uninsured Motorist Context
In recent years, alternative dispute resolution methods such as arbitration
have found increased acceptance, but the use of arbitration in the UM context
predates this movement by several decades.2 8 Some have suggested that the in-
surance industry chose arbitration as the dispute resolution mechanism for UM
cases in order to avoid or lessen a conflict of interest between the insurance com-
pany and the insured. 29 For example, one court noted:
[T]he position of an automobile insurer with respect to its insured's cul-
pability at the time of an accident may differ when defending the insured
against a third party claim from that when defending itself against an in-
sured's uninsured or underinsured motorist claim. In the former the in-
surer's interest usually is to minimize that culpability, whereas in the lat-
ter two instances its interest frequently is to maximize the insured's fault.
We recognize that one of the purposes, at least, of providing for arbitra-
tion ... in uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage endorsements
is to minimize that conflict of interest.
30
Whether the process of arbitration, rather than a trial, actually affects the con-
flict of interest situation is debatable. In the most common cases, caused by the
26. Id. See also WiDiss, supra note 4, § 1.8.
27. WlDiss, supra note 4, § 1.8.
28. See id. §§ 22.2, 22.3.
29. Id. §§ 22.3, 28.3.
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negligence of a single driver, once it becomes clear that the at-fault driver is unin-
sured, the injured policyholder, now a UM claimant, is thrust into a position that is
adverse to her own insurance company. The injury victim wants to recover UM
benefits; the insurance company wants to avoid paying. This is an unavoidable
conflict, regardless of whether the dispute is ultimately resolved by arbitration or
by a trial.
There is another explanation as to why the insurance industry chose arbitra-
tion as the dispute resolution mechanism for UM cases; it may have done so to
avoid jury trials. One court has observed, "[t]he requirement that parties arbitrate
uninsured and underinsured motorist claims is designed, in significant part, to
limit the insurer's exposure by precluding a jury trial with its attendant risks. 31
If the insurance industry was concerned about having to defend UM cases in
court (with juries viewing the insurance company as a "deep pockets" defendant),
then the mechanism of arbitration certainly removes that risk. Regardless of mo-
tivations, however, it is important to understand that from the very beginning, the
insurance industry itself has been the prime architect of the insurance policies-
and of the statutes-pertaining to uninsured motorist protection. Widiss empha-
sizes this in his treatise:
When dealing with a claim under the uninsured motorist insurance, one
of the most important things to remember is that the coverage terms have
been almost entirely developed privately by the insurance industry-that
is, the policy language defining the scope of coverage afforded by the in-
surance was prepared and promulgated by the industry in response to sig-
nificant pressures for changes in the accident compensation system (so
that accident victims would be assured a source of indemnification) ....
32[T]he public did not directly influence the terms of the coverage.
As mentioned previously, almost all states require insurance companies to in-
clude UM coverage-or at least offer it-at the same time that they sell a policy
of automobile insurance.33 But most statutes do not go into much detail regarding
the nature or scope of the coverage required, and often the statutes consist of no
more than a short, simple statement that insurance companies must include (or
offer) UM coverage when selling auto liability insurance. 34 Widiss comments
that:
Whether this legislation is the result of effective lobbying by the insur-
ance industry or simply that these statutes were drafted only with a view
to compelling the issuance of the "standard coverage" as conceived by
the [insurance] industry, the failure of either the industry to design or the
states to specifically define a coverage which provides a full range of
protection ... has led to a continuous flow of litigation by claimants at-
31. Huizar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 839, 841 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
32. WIDISS, supra note 4, § 1.14 (emphasis added).
33. JERRY, supra note 3, § 135.
34. WiDiss, supra note 4, § 1.14.
2005]
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tempting to secure indemnification in instances where the coverage terms
35purport either to limit or to preclude recovery.
4. Uninsured Motorist Arbitration in Illinois
The Illinois statute is similar to those of many other states in that it uses sim-
ple language to require that insurance companies sell UM coverage to their cus-
tomers; it provides:
No policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law
for bodily injury or death ... arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle ... shall be renewed, delivered, or issued...
unless coverage is provided therein . . . in limits for bodily injury or
death set forth in [s]ection 7-203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code for the pro-
tection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.36
As discussed previously, Illinois is one of three states whose statute requires
that UM cases be arbitrated, but the following provision is unique to the Illinois
statute:
Any decision made by the arbitrators shall be binding for the amount of
damages not exceeding $50,000 for bodily injury to or death of any one
person ... or the corresponding policy limits for bodily injury or death,
whichever is less.
37
Thus, by means of section 5/143a of the Illinois Insurance Code, the state re-
quires that insurance companies sell UM coverage in all auto policies, requires
arbitration of UM claims, and provides that an arbitration award is binding if it is
for $50,000 or less.
B. How Other Courts Have Ruled On Similar Escape Clauses
As mentioned previously, many states prohibit insurance companies from im-
posing arbitration, while three states require that UM cases be resolved by arbitra-
tion. 38 Of the three states that require arbitration, Illinois is the only state to pro-
35. Id.
36. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003) (emphasis added).
37. Id. (emphasis added). Although many insurance policies contain similar escape clauses in their
UM and UIM coverages, the author has not found any other instance in which a statute mandates such
an escape mechanism.
38. See infra Part I. It is common for different state legislatures to come up with different ap-
proaches to the same problem. Here, with respect to arbitration of UM cases, some of the states are
taking not only different approaches, but opposite approaches, with a few requiring arbitration and
many others prohibiting it. It is possible that this reflects a simple philosophical preference for one
form of dispute resolution over another. However, it is the author's hypothesis that the statutory ap-
proach adopted by many states is more likely the result of interest-based politics, with the insurance
industry being a prominent player. Even in a state with no statute on the question, the state's environ-
[Vol. I
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vide that an arbitration award over a specified threshold is non-binding. Thus,
Illinois is the only state that has a statutorily created escape clause. However,
even before the legislature amended the Illinois UM statute to include this provi-
sion, insurance companies had already been using this escape clause in their in-
surance policies, both with respect to uninsured motorist coverage, as well as un-
derinsured motorist coverage.
39
Starting around the 1980s (and continuing to the present), injury victims have
challenged these contractual escape clauses on multiple grounds. The vast major-
ity of courts that have addressed the escape clause issue have held that these
clauses are unenforceable.4° In striking down these provisions, the courts initially
relied on the rationale that such an escape mechanism violated the state's public
policy favoring arbitration to resolve disputes-and by "arbitration" these courts
meant binding arbitration. Most of the early opinions had an undercurrent of sus-
picion that the clauses had been drafted in order to give the insurance companies
an unfair advantage over injury victims, but the legal basis most explicitly relied
ment may be considered "pro-insurance" because a laissez-faire approach allows companies to use
their superior bargaining position to simply impose arbitration by means of their insurance policies.
39. Whereas "UM" stands for uninsured motorist, and is intended to protect victims of collisions
caused by drivers who are totally uninsured, "UIM" stands for underinsured motorist. UIM is in-
tended to protect victims of collisions caused by drivers who have insurance, but whose insurance
coverage is not large enough to compensate for all the damages suffered. For example, the minimum
amount of auto liability insurance required in Illinois is $20,000 per person. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/7-203, 5/7-601 (2003). If a driver with $20,000 of liability coverage negligently collides with an-
other vehicle or pedestrian and inflicts $50,000 of damage on the victim, then the driver with only
$20,000 of liability coverage is "underinsured" with respect to that occurrence. If the injury victim
(whether a motorist or pedestrian) has $50,000 of UIM coverage with her own auto insurance, then the
victim's own UIM coverage is supposed to compensate for the loss not covered by the tortfeasor's
insurance.
40. Field v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-41 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding trial de
novo provision void for violating public policy favoring binding arbitration as a means of settling
disputes and avoiding litigation); O'Neill v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 397, 400 (D. Vt.
1992) (holding escape hatch in UIM provision void "in the light of patent discrimination" and the
state's public policy in favor of binding arbitration); Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 68 P.3d
901, 906-07 (N.M. 2003) (reversing prior state supreme court case, and holding that escape clause: (1)
violated public policy against dilution of UM coverage; and (2) was void as substantively unconscion-
able); Godfrey v. Hartford Cas. Inc. Co., 16 P.3d 617, 624 (Wash. 2001) (holding trial de novo clause
in UIM provision violated the state arbitration act and was therefore unenforceable); Huizar v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 952 P.2d 342, 349 (Colo. 1998) (en banc, with two justices dissenting and one not participat-
ing) (holding trial de novo clause unenforceable as violating public policies of: (1) preventing dilution
of UM coverage; (2) preventing undue delay in access to the courts; and (3) favoring arbitration as an
alternative to litigation); Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788, 791-92 (Del. 1992) (holding
trial de novo provision void as against public policy favoring arbitration and concluding that the lower
court "was correct in striking this unconscionable clause"); Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d
1242, 1248 (Ohio 1992) (7-1 plurality decision with four justices concurring in result only) (holding
that because of the inclusion of the escape hatch, the insurance policy did not provide for "true arbitra-
tion," and therefore "the entire agreement to 'arbitrate' clause" was unenforceable); Mendes v. Auto.
Ins. Co., 563 A.2d 695, 699 (Conn. 1989) (holding that escape clause in a Ulm provision was unen-
forceable as against public policies in favor of final arbitral resolution, and against unfair claim settle-
ment practices); Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn. 1988) (hold-
ing trial de novo clause unenforceable for violating public policy favoring arbitration); Pepin v. Am.
Universal Ins. Co., 540 A.2d 21, 22-23 (R.I. 1988) (holding that trial de novo provision was void as
against public policy which favored binding arbitration and was expressed in the state's arbitration
act); Hoerst v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 624 A.2d 187, 189 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (2-1 decision)
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upon by the courts was that the clauses violated the state's public policy favoring
arbitration.
As time passed, courts have become more and more explicit in basing their
rulings on unconscionability and other grounds. In 1998, the Supreme Court of
Colorado, in perhaps the most thorough and analytical decision to that point, held
that the standard escape clause in the policy sold by the "good hands" people vio-
lated public policy because it not only undermined the finality of arbitration, but
because it also delayed access to the courts and diluted the UM protection that the
legislature intended to give to victims of uninsured motorists.4 1
In 2003, the Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed an earlier decision it
had made, and held that the standard escape clause in the policy sold by the "good
neighbor" people violated public policy because it diluted UM protection and that
it was void because it was substantively unconscionable.42
With two notable exceptions, when courts have struck down escape clauses,
the remedy most frequently used has been to excise the offending language, but
leave the remaining arbitration agreement intact. In other words, in those cases in
which an arbitration decision had already been made, the courts treated it as final
and binding on both parties, with neither party eligible for a trial de novo.
The first of the two notable exceptions is the remedy used by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in Schaefer v. Allstate Insurance Co. 43 In Schaefer, the court exam-
ined several definitions of "arbitration," and reasoned that because "arbitration"
must be final and binding, the provision in the Allstate policy (which included the
standard escape clause) was not really an agreement to arbitrate.44 The Schaefer
court then ruled that the entire "arbitration agreement" in the Allstate policy was
unenforceable, and that the parties therefore needed to resolve their dispute in the
court system.
45
David and Jeanette Schaefer were probably pleased with this result. Al-
though there was no dispute that Jeanette suffered from a serious condition caused
by a head injury, their insurance company had argued at arbitration that her condi-
tion was a result of a fall Jeanette had experienced a year before the auto colli-
46
sion. Unconvinced that the auto collision had caused Jeanette's condition, the
arbitration panel nevertheless believed that the Schaefers had sustained some in-
jury as a result of the collision, and awarded them $500 and $1,500. 4 7
On the other hand, in the case involving Janie Fallon-Murphy and Michael
Murphy, which was joined with the Schaefer case on appeal, it was the insurance
company that wanted a trial de novo, following an arbitration award of over
$1,000,000.48 Acknowledging that "the sword has two edges," the Schaefer court
41. Huizar, 952 P.2d at 349-50.
42. Padilla, 68 P.3d at 906-07.
43. 590 N.E.2d 1242 (Ohio 1992). For additional discussion of Schaefer, see Steven R. Leppard,
Note, Arbitration? Sure, But Only On Our Terms: Escape Clauses in Uninsured Motorist Policies,
1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 193 (1993).
44. Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1248.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1243.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1249.
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held that those policyholders would lose their arbitration award, and, like the
Schaefers, would have to re-try their case in the court system.
49
The second notable exception is the remedy used by the Illinois appellate
court in the case of Kost v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass'n.50 In Kost, the
court ruled that because of the unfairness of the trial de novo clause, the insurance
company would not be permitted to use it, but that the trial de novo clause could
be used by the injury victim.5 1
The Kost case involved an arbitration award in an underinsured motorist
case. 52 As mentioned previously, the Illinois statute governing uninsured motorist
coverage requires that the insurance policy contain an escape clause in its unin-
sured motorist coverage (making arbitration awards binding only if they are under
the applicable threshold)i5 3 But the Illinois statute governing underinsured motor-
ist coverage does not require any such mechanism.54 The Kost court was not
faced with a statutorily-mandated escape mechanism. Indeed, in two cases prior
to Kost, two other districts of the Illinois Court of Appeals held that in the context
of underinsured motorist coverage, the escape clause was contrary to public pol-
icy, unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable.
Thus, in Kost, the court held that the proper remedy was to allow the people
who purchase the insurance the option of using the trial de novo provision, but to
prevent the insurance company from doing so.56 Writing for a unanimous court,
Judge Goldenhersch stated:
Allowing an insurer who has placed a biased trial de novo provision in a
policy to then claim that the provision is void against public policy when
an insured attempts to enforce the provision should not be sanctioned by
the courts . . . . The benefit of a trial de novo should not be withheld
from an insured simply because the insurer drafted the provision unfairly.
The court should not shelter the defendant's duplicity.57
And the court observed:
Defendant may have hoped that unwary claimants would accept lower
arbitration awards or that the clause could be used as a tool in negotiation
after arbitration to lower insureds' expectation of success and increase
the costs of pursuing the claim . . . . In any event, it is of the highest
irony that a provision that our courts have found to be against public pol-
49. Id.
50. Kost v. Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass'n., 766 N.E.2d 676 (111. App. Ct. 2002).
51. Id. at 679.
52. Id. at 676.
53. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003).
54. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a-2 (2003).
55. Parker v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 734 N.E. 2d 83, 86 (111. App. Ct. 2000) (2-1 decision) (holding
trial de novo clause unconscionable and contrary to public policy); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v.
Bugailiskis, 662 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding trial de novo clause against public
policy, considering cost and delay, unequal application of the escape clause, and earmarks of a contract
of adhesion).
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icy because of manipulative drafting by insurers should now be claimed
by defendant to be a shield against an insured's suit.
58
By way of a short summary, we can classify the remedies courts have used
with escape clauses into three approaches: (1) use a knife to cut out the trial de
novo provision, but leave the remainder of the arbitration agreement intact and
binding on all parties; (2) use an ax to chop away the entire arbitration agreement,
and require all parties to resolve their dispute in the court system; or (3) use a
scalpel to excise the trial de novo provision from use by the insurance company,
but allow it to be used by the insurance customer, who would have had a reason-
able expectation of being able to use that provision.59
III. SUMMARY OF REED V. FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP
A. Facts and Procedural History
In April of 1995, Julie Reed was injured while driving in the Illinois town of
East Peoria. At an intersection, a vehicle collided with a second vehicle, and the
second vehicle then struck Reed's car.6 1 The first driver fled the scene, and was
never identified. 62 Because unidentified hit-and-run drivers are considered to be
uninsured motorists under Illinois law, 63 in order to be compensated for her inju-
ries, Reed was required to pursue a UM claim against her own insurance com-
pany, the Farmers Insurance Group.64 The insurance policy that Farmers had sold
to Reed contained a clause providing that any UM case would be arbitrated, and
that the amount of any arbitration award would be binding "unless the amount of
the award for damages exceeds the minimum required limits set forth in the Illi-
nois Financial Responsibility Law. 65
Reed filed a declaratory judgment action against her insurer, Farmers Insur-
ance Group, in the circuit court of Tazewell County. 66 Her complaint attacked
both the escape clause provision in the insurance policy, as well as the statute
requiring that UM claims be submitted to arbitration. She sought to have the in-
surance policy provision declared void as against public policy, and the statute
67declared unconstitutional. In a second count of her complaint, she asked for
58. Id. at 679-80.
59. Although Kost did not specifically refer to it, the "doctrine of reasonable expectations" is a
method of resolving insurance disputes that focuses on what the person buying the insurance would
reasonably have expected to receive under the insurance contract. See generally, JERRY, supra note 3,
§ 25D. As Kost succinctly puts it: "Refusing to allow plaintiffs to enforce the provision would deny a
benefit contracted for ...." 766 N.E.2d at 679.
60. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (111. 1999).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003).
64. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 685 N.E.2d 385 (Il. App. Ct. 1997).
65. Id. at 387.
66. See Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Il. 1999).
67. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 685 N.E.2d 385, 386 (I1. App. Ct. 1997).
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damages for her injury.68 Her insurance company moved to dismiss, and the trial
69
court granted the insurance company's motion.
The appellate court reversed and held that the escape clause in the insurance
policy was unconscionable. 70 Further, the court held that the statute that required
insurance policies to impose arbitration in UM cases was unconstitutional, be-
cause it impaired an insurance customer's freedom of contract. 71 The appellate
court stated that "compulsory arbitration takes away the full flexibility of the par-
ties to choose whether to arbitrate and the way arbitration is structured, and de-
tracts from the stated purpose of the statute.
' 72
B. Majority Opinion
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court.73 After briefly re-
viewing the facts of the case, the majority noted that, as required by the Illinois
Insurance Code, the insurance policy contained a clause requiring arbitration of
any UM claim if the insurance company and the claimant were unable to agree on
a settlement. 74 The majority further noted that-as also required by the Illinois
statute-the insurance policy provided that any arbitration award would be bind-
ing only if it was less than or equal to the minimum amount of liability insurance
required by the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law.75 If the arbitration award
was for an amount greater than the minimum insurance coverage requirements,
then "either party" could reject the award and proceed to trial.76
The majority then turned its attention to the procedural history of the case,
noting that the plaintiff, Julie Reed, had challenged both the clause permitting a
trial de novo for amounts over $20,000, as well as the statute requiring mandatory
arbitration of UM cases.77 The majority listed the various arguments advanced by
the plaintiff and briefly discussed the reasoning relied upon by the appellate court
when it held that the trial de novo provision was unconscionable (and the statute
requiring arbitration unconstitutional).78
After a review of the pertinent portion of the statute, the majority began its
analysis of the plaintiffs arguments.79 It first discussed the plaintiff's contention
that the trial de novo provision was against public policy.80 The majority cited
several cases that had been relied on by the plaintiff, and then commented:
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 390.
71. Id. at 391.
72. Id. at 391.
73. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1061 (111. 1999).
74. Id. at 1055.
75. Id. The Illinois Financial Responsibility Law requires minimum automobile liability insurance
coverage in the amounts of $20,000 because of bodily injury or death to one person, $40,000 because
of bodily injury or death to two or more persons, and $15,000 because of damage to or destruction of
property. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-203 (2002).
76. Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1055.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1055-56.
79. Id. at 1056.
80. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (Il1. 999).
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Some courts that have invalidated provisions similar to the one at issue
here have observed that the nonbinding character of the award conflicts
with the goals of arbitration, which is designed to promote finality and
judicial economy. Other cases that have invalidated these provisions be-
lieve that they are unfairly structured in favor of the insurer, because the
insurer is free to reject large awards, but the insured does not enjoy a cor-
responding right to reject small awards.8'
These cases were distinguished from other jurisdictions. The court reasoned
that the plaintiffs public policy challenge was unpersuasive, on the grounds that
the de novo mechanism was itself "an expression of public policy," because it was
required by statute. The majority noted that "[in each of the foreign decisions
cited [which invalidated] similar measures, the special provision allowing the
rejection of awards over a specified threshold was inserted by the insurer without
legislative authorization .... [I]n contrast, the [Illinois] legislature has determined
that uninsured-motorist coverage must contain this provision ...."82
The majority concluded that the statutory requirement was dispositive in the
Reed case, stating:
The public policy of the state is found in its constitution, its statutes, and
its judicial decisions . . . . We do not believe that the provision chal-
lenged here ... can be said to be violative of public policy-the provi-
sion is required by statute and appears in the plaintiff's insurance contract
• 83
by virtue of legislative action.
The majority next turned to the issue of whether the statute interferes with the
parties' freedom of contract. 84 Discussing the United States Constitution first, the
majority observed that it only prohibits state actions that "impair the obligation of
pre-existing contracts."' 85 Because the plaintiff had not asserted that the statute
interfered with a pre-existing contract, the majority reasoned that the United States
Constitution did not apply to the issue.86 The majority then characterized the
plaintiff's argument stating that "the plaintiffs objection instead seems to be that
the statute violates her freedom to contract because it requires that the arbitration
clause be part of her insurance policy."
87
According to the majority, "[t]he right of individuals to contract as they
please arises from considerations of due process ' ' 8 and due process (in the context
of economic legislation) only requires that the statute be "rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.', 89 Beginning its due process analysis, the ma-
81. Id. at 1057 (internal citations omitted).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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jority stated that "we need not be convinced that the method chosen by the legisla-
ture constitutes the best or most efficient means of dealing with the problem at
hand. Rather, it is sufficient if the legislation bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest." 90
The majority then noted that the purpose of the Illinois UM statute is to pro-
vide "at least minimum insurance coverage" to persons injured by uninsured mo-
torists, and it asserted that the arbitration provision in the statute was rationally
related to that goal. 9' Two possible justifications were given for the legislature's
actions: "In drafting [the arbitration provision], the legislature could well have
concluded that mandatory binding arbitration for smaller claims-those falling
below $20,000-would help reduce litigation costs and would promote the speedy
resolution of those cases."92 The court further reasoned that "if awards under
financial responsibility limits were not binding, then an insurer could defeat the
statutor' purpose of the coverage by seeking review of arbitral awards under those
limits." The majority then wrapped up its freedom of contract/rational relation
analysis by observing, "[l]egislation enjoys a strong presumption of constitutional-
ity," and that the court did not believe the plaintiff had overcome the presump-
tion.94
The next constitutional issue to be examined was whether the statute violated
the due process rights of UM claimants by denying them "access to the courts.
95
Here, the majority referred to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co. 96 Hardware Deal-
ers involved a Minnesota statute that required fire insurance policies to include a
provision for mandatory arbitration.97 The statute provided that the arbitration
proceeding would determine a single issue: the amount of loss caused by any
particular fire.98 All other issues would be resolved in the court system.99 The
Supreme Court held that the Minnesota statute was constitutional.
The majority in Reed quoted a paragraph from the Hardware Dealers opin-
ion, containing the following core rationale:
[T]he requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment... are satisfied if the
substitute remedy is substantial and efficient. We cannot say that the de-
termination by arbitrators . . . of the single issue of the amount of loss
under a fire insurance policy, reserving all other issues for trial in court,
does not afford such a remedy .... t00





94. Id. at 1058-59.
95. Id. at 1059.
96. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 155-56.
99. Id. at 156.
100. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (IIl. 1999) (quoting Hardware Dealers Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931)).
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The arbitration requirement at issue here is not significantly broader than
the one approved by the Supreme Court in Hardware Dealers. This
court has previously determined that arbitration under section 143a is
limited to two issues: whether the insured is entitled to recover damages
from the operator or owner of an uninsured vehicle, and the amount of
damages under the policy.' 0 '
Concluding its discussion of the issue, the majority determined that the "nar-
row range of issues" that the Illinois statute requires to be arbitrated makes it simi-
lar to the statute approved in Hardware Dealers.1°2 The majority's analysis con-
tinued by next considering whether the statute violated equal protection or consti-
tuted invalid special legislation under the Illinois Constitution. Because, the ma-
jority asserted, the UM statute did not impinge on a fundamental right or create a
suspect classification, it therefore only needed to meet the rational relationship
test. 10 3 The majority concluded its discussion of the issue by saying that its earlier
consideration of the possible rational relationship answered these challenges as
well.'104
After resolving the federal constitutionality of the provision, the Reed major-
ity considered whether the mandatory arbitration imposed by the UM statute vio-
lated the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. The state
constitution provides: "The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall re-
main inviolate."'
0 5
In support of this point, the plaintiff cited Grace v. Howlett,0 6 which invali-
dated a no-fault auto insurance statute, but the majority said that the jury trial
issue had been more recently addressed in Martin v. Heinold Commodities. 107 The
Martin case held that litigants were not entitled to a jury trial in suits brought pur-
suant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud statute. 0 8 The court reasoned that the jury
trial right guaranteed in the Illinois Constitution was limited to actions that existed
under the English common law at the time that the constitution was adopted.1° 9
The majority returned to the Grace case and concluded the jury trial issue by
asserting:
We do not believe that Grace is controlling here. The action at issue in
Grace was a common law claim for personal injuries arising from a mo-
tor vehicle accident. In the present case, in contrast, the underlying claim
is one for [UM] coverage, a remedy that did not exist at common law but
instead was recently devised by the legislature. 10
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1060.
104. Id.
105. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
106. Grace v. Howlett, 283 N.E.2d 474 (I11. 1972).
107. Martin v. Heinold Commodities, 643 N.E.2d 734 (111. 1994).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 758-59.
110. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (l. 1999).
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The last issue the majority addressed was whether the arbitration provision of
the statute "create[d] a system of fee officers."'' The Illinois Constitution spe-
cifically prohibits fee officers from the judicial system. 1 2 The majority pointed
out that the UM statute was silent regarding the parties' responsibility to pay the
fees of the arbitrators, and thus it was a matter controlled by the insurance pol-
icy. 1 3 Referring then to the specific insurance policy used by the parties, the
court noted that it required an equal division of the costs, but that it had an excep-
tion that provided, "in no event shall the expenses of arbitration to the insured
person reduce recovery below the minimum limits required by the Illinois Finan-
cial Responsibility Law."' 14  The majority pointed out that arbitration awards
under the UM statute did not have to be entered by a court, and concluded that it
did not believe that UM arbitrators could be said to become "fee officers in the
judicial system."' 15
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Bilandic wrote the dissenting opinion, and was joined Justice Heiple
and Justice Harrison.11 6 The dissent indicated that it would hold the mandatory
arbitration portion of the UM statute unconstitutional."17 It observed that although
statutes do carry a presumption of constitutionality, it is the duty of the Illinois
Supreme Court "to protect the rights of individuals against acts beyond the scope
of legislative power,"' l18 and that "[i]f a statute is unconstitutional, this court must
declare it invalid."' 19
The dissent observed that the imbalanced arbitration clause is not consistent
with the purpose of the Illinois statute because:
The purpose ... is to provide at least minimum insurance coverage to an
insured who has been injured by an uninsured motorist. The arbitration
clause is not rationally related to this purpose. Making awards below
$20,000 binding on the insured has no relation to providing minimum in-
surance coverage to individuals injured by uninsured motonists. 2 °
The dissent also pointed out that a majority of courts have found that this type
of mechanism unfairly favors insurance companies, and then quoted from the
opinion in Klopp, calling the provision an escape hatch for insurance compa-
111. Id. at 1060-61.
112. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (emphasis added). The pertinent provision states:
Judges shall receive salaries provided by law which shall not be diminished to take effect during
their terms of office. All salaries and such expenses as may be provided by law shall be paid by
the State, except that Appellate, Circuit and Associate Judges shall receive such additional com-
pensation from counties within their district or circuit as may be provided by law. There shall be
no fee officers in the judicial system.
113. Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1060.
114. Id. at 1061.
115. Id.
116. Id. (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1061-62.
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nies. 12 1 Finally, the dissent distinguished the statute that the United States Su-
preme Court had upheld in the Hardware Dealers case, pointing out that the stat-
ute in that case was "truly neutral" and did not favor insurance companies to the
detriment of their insureds.
122
IV. ANALYSIS
A. How Reed Erred
1. The Escape Clause
The escape clause issue in Reed has two possible points of focus. First,
whether the insurance policy provision is unconscionable or otherwise sufficiently
defective to invalidate it. Second, whether the Illinois statutory provision that
requires the insurance escape clause is unconstitutional or otherwise legally defec-
tive. Here, we focus on the statute.
First of all, the statutory provision requiring the escape clause seems strongly
at odds with Illinois public policy articulated by numerous court decisions, l12 as
well as the Illinois Constitution. More importantly, in requiring that insurance
policies contain the escape clause, the statute is unconstitutional in at least two
respects: (1) it violates the promise of "prompt" justice under the Illinois Consti-
tution; and (2) it deprives UM injury victims of equal protection of the laws guar-
anteed by the Illinois Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.'
1 24
Starting with the public policy issue, we note that the majority in Reed said
that the de novo mechanism did not violate public policy, because since it was
required by statute, it was itself "an expression of public policy." The court as-
serted that a state's public policy "[i]s found in its constitution, its statutes, and its
judicial decisions .... We do not believe that the provision challenged here...
121. Id. (quoting Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992)).
122. Id. at 1063.
123. Many cases have discussed the purpose of the UM statute, oftentimes using almost identical
language. The 1992 Illinois Supreme Court opinion in the Hoglund case put it this way: "[Tihe public
policy behind the uninsured motorist statute is to place the injured party in substantially the same
position he would be in if the uninsured driver had been insured." Hoglund v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 592 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (111. 1992). The escape clause conflicts with that public policy. It
forces UM injury victims into a two-step system in which if they "lose" the first round (by getting an
award under $50,000), then they are bound by it, and yet, if they "win" the first round, then the insur-
ance company can say "that didn't count." The escape clause also imposes greater delay and greater
costs upon UM injury victims than they would have had if they had been able to litigate against an
insured driver in the court system. Thus, the escape clause is clearly contrary to the public policy of
putting UM injury victims in "substantially the same position" they would have been in if the unin-
sured driver had been insured.
124. In pertinent part, the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall.., deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Because it is an Illinois statute that
requires arbitration of UM claims, as well as the escape clause allowing insurance companies to de-
mand a trial de novo arbitration awards over $50,000, there is "state action." The Illinois statute af-
fects both "liberty" interests (such as the right to contract), and "property" interests (such as the owner-
ship of a cause of action against the victim's insurance company).
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can be said to be violative of public policy-the provision is required by statute
and appears in the plaintiff's insurance contract by virtue of legislative action.
'2
5
It is important to restate the first part of that statement: 'The public policy of
the state is found in its constitution, its statutes, and its judicial decisions .... 26
Even though the statute in this case requires the escape clause (and thus may be
considered some statement of public policy), the provision requiring it seems to be
in conflict with the following portion of the Illinois Constitution: "Every person
shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he re-
ceives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by
law, freely, completely, and promptly."'
' 27
As a statement of public policy, this section of the Illinois Constitution would
be controlling over any public policy embodied in a statute. But this section is not
simply a statement of public policy. It is part of the Illinois Constitution, and as
such, is much more than a statement of public policy: it creates constitutional
rights that may not be abridged by a statute, whatever the purpose of the statute, or
the motivations of the legislature that passed it. Thus, the point of the following
discussion is not merely that the escape clause violates a public policy in favor of
prompt justice, but also that the statute requiring the escape clause is unconstitu-
tional because it violates the constitutional guarantee that every person shall ob-
tain justice promptly.
By requiring arbitration, and also by requiring a trial de novo provision appli-
cable to all arbitration awards over $50,000, the UM statute is contrary to the con-
stitutional guarantee that every person shall obtain justice promptly. The escape
clause creates a "gauntlet" for the injury victim, in which arbitration is only a first
step-necessitating effort and expense, to be sure-but only a first step that is
time-consuming and functions as only a precursor to litigation. 128
As noted above, several courts have examined and struck down similar es-
cape clauses imposed by the insurance policies of various companies.' 29 Among
the other difficulties created by the escape clause, many of those courts have spe-
cifically mentioned the problem of delay. For example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court commented:
By permitting resort to the court system for a trial de novo notwithstand-
ing the absence of any claimed impropriety in the arbitration process it-
self, by fostering multiple hearings in multiple forums, by increasing the
costs to the contracting parties, and, by unnecessarily, and without real
cause, extending the time consumed in resolving the controversy [the es-
cape clause] likewise operates to defeat goals designed to promote judi-
cial economy and respect for the judicial system. 30
125. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1057 (I11. 999).
126. Id.
127. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
128. That is, it is a precursor to litigation if the injury victim is not bound by a low or $0 arbitration
award.
129. See discussion infra Part I.A(4)(b).
130. Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Minn. 1988) (emphasis
added). In Schmidt, the insurance company (with a compulsory arbitration clause and an escape clause
in its policy) argued that its customer had derived sufficient benefits from the arbitration proceeding to
2005]
19
Hanagan: Hanagan: If You Lose, It Is Binding, but If You Win
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Delay favors insurance companies. Among other things, it allows them to
earn interest on the funds that rightfully belong to injury victims with meritorious
cases, and it increases the risk to the injury victim (who has the burden of proof)
that when the time finally comes to prove her case, vital evidence or witnesses
may no longer be available. Prior to 1978, the Illinois UM statute did not require
arbitration, 13 although many insurance companies imposed arbitration by means
of their insurance policies. The arbitration requirement was added to the statute
by Public Act 80-1135 (although the arbitration provision did not contain an es-
cape clause requirement at that time). One of the reasons given for requiring arbi-
tration under the statute was to provide an alternate way of naming arbitrators if
the insurance company resorted to the delay tactic of being slow to name an
arbitrator. 132 In one case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted:
At the time that the arbitration provision was added to section 143a(l),
the purpose of the legislation, as explained by its principal sponsor,
Senator Rock, was to expedite the processing of uninsured motorist
claims. According to the Senator, insurance companies that wanted to
postpone the payment of meritorious claims would attempt to delay the
selection of a panel of arbitrators to handle the particular case. The aim
of the provision was to ensure that matters could be submitted to one ar-
bitrator alone if the parties were unable to agree on a panel in a timely
fashion.
33
Given that the legislative purpose of the 1978 amendment was "to expedite
the processing of uninsured motorist claims," it is striking that twelve years later
the legislature again amended the statute to require that all insurance policies con-
tain the trial de novo clause in their UM provisions. 34 If insurance companies
used the naming of arbitrators as a delaying tactic, then the trial de novo/escape
clause certainly provides a much better delaying tactic. Clearly, the amendment
of the statute to require the trial de novo clause was not intended "to expedite the
processing of uninsured motorist claims," but, of course, different legislatures can
have different agendas. Regardless of the purpose of the statutory provision re-
quiring the escape clause, no statute may infringe on the constitutional right to
obtain justice promptly, as guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.
The statute requiring the escape clause is also constitutionally defective in
that it deprives UM injury victims of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
serve as a basis for estoppel. Id. at 872. When questioned as to what benefit Schmidt had received, the
insurance company asserted that "by demanding arbitration, Schmidt retained in himself a benefit
consisting of the right to demand a trial de novo if the [arbitration] award exceeded $25,000." Id.
From the point of view of the consumer who wishes to have his case resolved, this so-called benefit
may seem similar to asking a Chicago cab driver to take you to O'Hare Airport, and then having him
take you (without your permission) to Midway Airport instead. When you arrive at Midway, the cab
driver then points out the benefit you have derived from him taking you to Midway-you can now ask
him to take you to O'Hare.
131. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Yapejian, 605 N.E.2d 539, 541 (111. 1992).
132. Id. at 542.
133. Id.
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the Illinois Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The statutorily-mandated escape clause treats UM victims in an unfairly
different way than it treats insurance companies. Although the escape clause
would allow "either party" to request a trial de novo for arbitration awards over
$50,000, the "either party" phrase is an illusion of equality. In a case decided by
the Supreme Court of Ohio, Justice Sweeney explains why allowing both parties,
the insurer and the insured, to avoid arbitration awards in excess of $12,500 is not
"entirely fair":
This "facial equality" is not a true equality, however, because both par-
ties are bound only by low awards, which are likely to be in [the in-
surer's] favor. High awards can be avoided by either the insured or [the
insurer], but it is unlikely that an insured would ever seek to avoid a high
award, even if he was unsatisfied by it, because by avoiding the award
and seeking a trial the insured would incur additional legal expense while
also placing at risk the entire award that he already has received. Thus,
the real impact and effect of [the escape clause] is to give [the insurer]
the power to avoid high arbitration awards, regardless of whether those
awards are fair and just.135
The real impact of the escape clause is to give the insurance company the
power to avoid high arbitration awards, "regardless of whether those awards are
fair and jUSt.' ' 136 But the provision has another side to it, also favorable to the
insurance company. The provision is also a trap for injury victims, because, to
paraphrase Justice Sweeney, another impact of the escape clause is to give the
insurance company the power to bind injury victims to low arbitration awards,
"regardless of whether those awards are unfair and unjust.' 137
2. The Escape Clause Flunks the Rational Basis Test
Except in cases requiring a higher standard, in order for most statutes to sur-
vive a challenge that they deprive persons of equal protection of the laws, they
must meet the rational basis test.' 38 The rational basis test requires that the statute
have a legitimate governmental objective as its end, and use a rational means to
attain that end. 139 The majority in Reed, in its rational basis discussion of the
escape clause, stated:
135. Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Marsh, 472 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ohio 1984) (Sweeney, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. The Supreme Court has outlined the scope of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment based on various factors. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439-40 (1985). Generally, a state's legislation "is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. This is the
"rational basis" test; it has been described as a "low hurdle." Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d
1058 (11. 1999).
139. See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1058-59.
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The purpose of section 143a is to provide at least minimum insurance
coverage to an insured who has been injured by an uninsured driver. We
believe that the arbitration provision is rationally related to that goal. In
drafting [the arbitration provision], the legislature could well have con-
cluded that mandatory binding arbitration for smaller claims-those fal-
ling below $20,000-would help reduce litigation costs and would pro-
mote the speedy resolution of those cases .... [I]f awards under finan-
cial responsibility limits were not binding, then an insurer could defeat
the statutory purpose of the coverage by seeking review of arbitral
awards under those limits.' 4°
A careful reading of this passage shows that the majority articulates three
things: (1) that a possible end of the UM statute is to provide at least minimum
coverage to a UM injury victim; (2) that a possible end of the escape clause provi-
sion is to reduce costs and speed resolution by requiring awards under the then-
current threshold of $20,000 to be binding; and (3) that a possible means of ac-
complishing the end of cheaper and faster resolution is by preventing "insurance
companies" from reviewing awards under $20,000. 141
Items two and three require our greatest attention, but first we will consider
the ends and means of the original statute. The original Illinois UM statute, en-
acted decades ago, did not require arbitration of UM claims, and did not require
insurance policies to have an escape clause or trial de novo provision; it simply
required that insurance companies selling automobile insurance also had to sell
UM coverage to their customers.
The original statute clearly passes the rational basis test. The end of that stat-
ute-the legitimate governmental purpose-was to compensate people injured by
uninsured drivers and, additionally, to prevent those injury victims from having to
draw on taxpayer-funded charity or welfare programs. The means of that stat-
ute-requiring insurance companies to sell UM coverage to their customers-was
also rational. The insurance companies authorized to do business in the state of
Illinois make substantial profits selling their insurance to Illinois consumers, and it
is fair and logical that, as one condition of making those profits, those insurance
companies should be required to also sell their customers protection against unin-
sured motorists. That rationale seems even stronger now because in 1989 the state
began requiring that all owners of vehicles registered in Illinois purchase automo-
bile insurance. 142 Few other industries have customers compelled by law to buy
their products. 1
43
In contrast to the original UM statute, the statutory provision requiring that
insurance policies include an escape clause does not meet the rational basis test.1
44
140. Id. at 1059 (internal citations omitted).
141. At the time that the case was decided, the threshold at which awards became binding was
$20,000 (a recent legislative enactment has increased that threshold to $50,000).
142. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57-601 (2002).
143. Although the purpose of statutorily-required auto insurance may be the general protection of the
public, an incidental effect is that it increases the revenues of the insurance industry.
144. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Il. 1999). The court stated that:
ITihe legislature could well have concluded that mandatory binding arbitration for smaller
claims--those falling below $20,000--would help reduce litigation costs and would promote the
speedy resolution of those cases .... [l1]f awards under financial responsibility limits were not
(Vol. I
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The first stated end-to "reduce costs" and "speed resolution" of cases-seems to
be a legitimate governmental purpose. But the means it chooses-making awards
binding below a certain threshold-on UM cases only-is not rational or fair. A
critical analysis demonstrates why.
First, the statute applies only to UM injury victims, and not to all injury vic-
tims. For example, if a person injured by an insured driver receives a $0 verdict in
court, then that injury victim has a right to review by an appellate court. In con-
trast, if a person injured by an uninsured driver receives a $0 award in arbitration,
then that injury victim has virtually no remedy. UM arbitration is governed by the
Illinois version of the Uniform Arbitration Act, 14 5 and under that statute, an arbi-
tration award can be "vacated" only if it was "procured by corruption, fraud, or
other undue means."'' 46 Thus, in most cases, even if an arbitrator or arbitration
panel makes a mistake of law, the arbitration award cannot be vacated. 147 Treat-
ing UM injury victims as second-class citizens is not rational, and it certainly does
not place them in substantially the same position they would have been in if the
uninsured driver had been insured.
Another problem with using the $50,000 threshold to determine what awards
are binding is that it does not necessarily limit the binding effect to only "smaller
claims." In this respect, the Reed majority simply assumed that arbitration awards
always value cases correctly. In fact, a UM claimant may be entitled to very sub-
stantial damages, and yet through an error in the arbitration process, he or she may
receive a low or $0 arbitration award.
48
A third problem with using the $50,000 threshold is that it is arbitrary. The
financial responsibility statute requires owners of vehicles registered in Illinois to
buy liability insurance. 49 If a person violates that statute by driving with no in-
surance, the $50,000 binding/non-binding threshold has no rational bearing on the
insurance customer who has paid a higher premium in order to get higher UM
protection, such as $100,000 or $300,000.
Not only is the threshold arbitrary, but it produces drastically different results
in the two categories it creates. For example, arbitration awards just below
$50,000 are totally binding, no matter how unfair or unjust the result may be. But
arbitration awards just above $50,000 are totally non-binding, no matter how fair
or just the result. And, considering this latter situation, one has to wonder if the
legislative purpose was schizophrenic. Was the end purpose of treating awards
over $50,000 as totally non-binding to increase litigation costs and to promote
binding, then an insurer could defeat the statutory purpose of the coverage by seeking review of
arbitral awards under those limits.
Id.
145. See Calabrese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 543 N.E.2d 215, 216-18 (Il. App. Ct. 1989).
146. 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12 (2002).
147. Id.
148. An example of this sort of result may be present in the case of Alan Laatz, in which the sole
arbitrator inquired about Laatz's pending workers' compensation claim. Laatz v. Intergovernmental
Risk Mgmt. Agency, 784 N.E.2d 877 (I11. App. Ct. 2003). In a trial court, the workers' compensation
claim would be a "collateral source," not proper for a jury or judge to consider in determining either
liability or damages. After being told (by the opposing attorney) that the compensation case was still
pending, the arbitrator later made a finding that Laatz had been more than 50% at fault, and thus was
not "legally entitled to recover" compensation for his injuries. Id. at 878 (holding that the inquiry
about the workers' compensation case did not amount to grounds for vacating the arbitration award).
149. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-601 (2003).
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delay of those cases? If that is so, then the rationality of that end needs to be re-
examined in light of the Illinois Constitution which provides that every person
shall obtain justice by law freely and promptly.1 50
As a final point on the escape clause, "[I]f awards under financial responsibil-
ity limits were not binding, then an insurer could defeat the statutory purpose of
the coverage by seeking review of arbitral awards under those limits.",151 Here,
the stated end is to prevent insurance companies from defeating the purpose of
UM coverage by appealing arbitration decisions. Whether this would defeat the
purpose of the UM statute is debatable, and thus the end itself may not be "a le-
gitimate governmental purpose." But assuming that it is, the means-making
only awards under $50,000 binding-is irrational. Because insurance companies
would be more likely to appeal higher awards, if the end purpose of the statutory
provision is to prevent insurance companies from defeating the purpose of UM
coverage by appealing arbitration decisions, then it is irrational to make only low
awards binding, while simultaneously giving insurance companies the option of a
trial de novo on higher awards. And if, as the majority suggests, the purpose was
to prevent insurance companies from appealing, it is irrational to make those
lower awards binding on the injury victims as well the insurance companies.
Given the legislative end theorized by the majority, the statute uses an irrational
means to accomplish it.152
3. Mandatory Arbitration
Even if the escape clause were not present in the Illinois UM statute, the stat-
ute would still be unconstitutional because the UM statute forces UM injury vic-
tims to arbitrate their cases, rather than allowing them to resolve their cases in
court. The Illinois court system has well-established rules of evidence and proce-
dural safeguards that are not found in arbitration proceedings. Like the escape
clause issue, the mandatory arbitration issue in Reed has two possible points of
focus. First, whether the insurance policy provision that requires arbitration is
unconscionable or otherwise sufficiently defective to invalidate it. Second,
whether the Illinois statutory provision that requires arbitration is unconstitutional
or otherwise legally defective. Again, this article focuses on the statute.
The statutory provision requiring arbitration of all UM cases is unconstitu-
tional in at least three ways: (1) mandatory arbitration deprives UM injury vic-
tims of access to the courts, and thus deprives them of due process of law guaran-
teed by the Illinois Constitution, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution; (2) mandatory arbitration deprives UM injury
victims of the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution; and (3)
mandatory arbitration deprives UM injury victims of equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
150. See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
151. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (111. 1999).
152. The author is not advocating that insurance companies should have less rights than injury vic-
tims. Parties on both sides should have equal rights, should receive equal protection of the laws, and
should be treated the same-fairly.
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4. Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Injury Victims of Access to the Courts
The majority in Reed seemed to treat access to the courts as a due process is-
sue, with the test being whether the state action-in this case the statutory provi-
sion requiring arbitration of UM cases-is rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental purpose. 153 Although, as discussed above, the Reed majority said that
the legislature could have believed that mandatory binding arbitration for awards
under the then-current threshold of $20,000 would help reduce litigation expenses
and speed resolution of those cases, the majority did not explicitly articulate a
justification for the use of arbitration per se.
Instead, in responding to the issue of "access to the courts," and upholding the
arbitration compelled by the statute, the Reed majority relied on the United States
Supreme Court case of Hardware Dealers' Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Glid-
den,' 54 saying that the "narrow range of issues" that the Illinois statute requires to
be arbitrated makes it similar to the statute approved in Hardware Dealers.
55
However, the range of issues subject to arbitration under the Illinois statute is
really quite broad, and the statute approved in Hardware Dealers is significantly
different from the statute that governs Illinois UM cases.
Alluding to the escape clause, the minority in Reed correctly observed that the
statute in Hardware Dealers established a "truly neutral" process--certainly an
important point. 156 In addition, there are several other major differences between
the Minnesota statute in Hardware Dealers and the Illinois statute that requires
UM arbitration.
First of all, it may be significant to note that although the United States Su-
preme Court used the term "arbitration" when discussing the Minnesota statute in
Hardware Dealers, the statute itself did not use that term. In that portion of the
statute quoted by the Court, 57 it used variants of the terms "appraisal" eight times,
but never the term "arbitration" in any form. This choice of terminology is sig-
nificant because the term "appraisal" refers to a much more limited focus than
does the term "arbitration." Jerry explains that the use of an appraisal proceeding
is specifically intended "to resolve only questions of property valuation and ques-
tions of fact concerning the loss, not other disputed issues .... [T]he work of
appraisers is analogous to that of masters, who reach findings on particular sub-
mitted fact questions for the benefit of the court that must decide the entire
case."
158
Similarly, a federal case, determining the applicability of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA), observed that "there is generally a great distinction between arbi-
tration and appraisal, for while arbitration may be wide in its scope, an appraisal is
limited to the narrow issue of the amount of lOSS.'
159
153. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1059-60 (IlI. 1999).
154. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
155. Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1058.
156. Id. at 1063 (Bilandic, J., dissenting).
157. Hardware Dealers, 284 U.S. at 155 n.L
158. JERRY, supra note 3, § 84.
159. Rastelli Bros., Inc. v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 440, 446 (D. N.J. 1999) (holding that
an "appraisal" clause could not be enforced under the FAA because it was not an "arbitration" clause).
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This distinction between a narrowly focused appraisal, and the broader scope
of an arbitration, makes the Minnesota statute that Hardware Dealers held consti-
tutional significantly different than the Illinois UM arbitration statute. In Hard-
ware Dealers, the statute required that fire insurance policies include specific
provisions for the selection of appraisers. 160  The statute in Hardware Dealers
required that Minnesota fire insurance policies include provisions that: (1) limited
the appraisal procedure to only the single issue of estimating the value of a loss
caused by a fire (except for fires in which the building was a "total loss"); (2)
allowed either party to demand an appraisal of a fire loss, but waived that proce-
dure if neither party did so; and (3) did not provide a mechanism for an "appraisal
de novo" if the original appraisal exceeded a certain amount. This was the statute
about which the United States Supreme Court concluded:
Granted ... that the state, in the present circumstances, has power to pre-
scribe a summary method of ascertaining the amount of loss, the re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment ... are satisfied if the substi-
tute remedy is substantial and efficient. We cannot say that the determi-
nation by arbitrators ... of the single issue of the amount of loss under a
fire insurance policy, reserving all other issues for trial in court, does not
afford such a remedy .... 16
In contrast, the Illinois UM arbitration statute is significantly different. It is
different, first of all, because the scope of its arbitration procedure is much
broader. The appraisal procedure in Hardware Dealers dealt only with the single
issue of the amount of a fire loss, whereas the arbitration procedure under the
Illinois UM statute not only decides the "amount of loss" (i.e., the damages sus-
tained by the injury victim), it also decides all the other issues normally decided
in a jury trial.
For example, in addition to damages, the Illinois arbitration procedure de-
cides whether the uninsured driver was legally liable (i.e., negligent or in some
other way legally responsible), whether the injury victim was contributorily negli-
gent (or whether any other affirmative defense affects the right of the injury vic-
tim to recover), whether the amount of damages should be reduced as a conse-
160. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 155 n.1 (1931). The statute
was as follows:
In case of loss, except in case of total loss on buildings, under this policy and a failure of the par-
ties to agree as to the amount of the loss ... the amount of such loss shall ... be ascertained by
two competent, disinterested and impartial appraisers ... the insured and this company each se-
lecting one ... and the two so chosen shall first select a competent, disinterested and impartial
umpire; provided that if ... the two appraisers cannot agree on such an umpire, the presiding
judge of the district court... may appoint such an umpire...
Id. (emphasis added). Further, this provision was also included:
Unless within fifteen days after a statement of. .. loss has been rendered to the company, either
party, the assured or the company, shall have notified the other in writing that such party de-
mands an appraisal, such right to an appraisal shall be waived; the appraisers together shall then
estimate and appraise the loss, stating separately sound value and damage, and, failing to agree,
shall submit their differences to the umpire; and the award in writing of any two shall determine
the amount of the loss.
Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 159.
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quence of comparative fault, and whether the factual and medical evidence is
sufficient to prove that the collision was a proximate cause of the injuries and any
ongoing pain or disability complained of by the victim. Because all of these is-
sues are resolved in arbitration, errors with respect to the law or the facts would
not be subject to appellate review.
In contrast, the Minnesota statute in Hardware Dealers "reserved for trial" all
issues other than the valuation of the fire loss. Those issues "reserved for trial"
would include whether the fire insurance company was legally liable to pay for
the loss, whether the fire victim had breached any condition of the fire insurance
policy (or whether any other affirmative defense affected the right of the fire vic-
tim to recover) and whether the factual and scientific evidence was sufficient to
prove that the fire originated in a way that would require the insurance company
to indemnify the victim for the loss. Because all of these issues are resolved in
court, their proof would be subject to the rules of evidence and procedure, with the
safeguard of the right of appellate review.
The Illinois UM arbitration statute is also different from the Minnesota statute
with respect to the appropriateness of using "expert appraisers." In the Hardware
Dealers statute, the appraisal procedure was limited to estimating the value of
property damaged or destroyed by a fire, something that expert appraisers would
likely do better than a jury. In contrast, the issues to be determined in Illinois UM
cases-negligence, contributory negligence, proximate cause, and damages-are
routinely handled by Illinois courts and juries in cases where the at-fault driver
has insurance. 1
62
Another difference between the two statutes is that, although the Hardware
Dealers statute established an appraisal procedure to estimate the amount of a fire
loss, that procedure did not apply "in case of total loss on buildings." Conceiva-
bly, the Minnesota legislature may have reasoned that the total loss of a building
was such a substantial loss that the value of that loss should be determined in the
court system, rather than by the appraisal procedure. In contrast, the Illinois UM
arbitration statute requires arbitration for all losses caused by an uninsured motor-
ist, even if that loss is the death of a human being.
Yet another difference between the two statutes is that the Minnesota statute
makes its appraisal procedure "mandatory" only if one of the parties demands
appraisal. If neither party makes such a demand within the applicable time limit,
then the right to the appraisal procedure is waived, and the value of the loss is
determined in court, along with all the other issues in the case. In contrast, the
Illinois UM arbitration statute automatically requires arbitration of all UM cases,
and the parties have absolutely no choice in the matter.
5. Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Injury Victims of the Right to a Jury
Trial
The Illinois UM arbitration provision is also unconstitutional because it de-
prives UM injury victims of the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Illinois Con-
162. Considering that victims injured by insured drivers routinely use the court system to resolve
their disputes, and that the court system is both competent and experienced at resolving these disputes,
it does not seem rational to force victims injured by uninsured drivers to use a different system.
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stitution. The Illinois Constitution provides that "[tihe right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate."'' 63 In holding that the jury trial right
did not apply to UM cases, the majority in Reed cited Martin v. Heinold Com-
modities,164 in which the court had previously held that litigants were not entitled
to a jury trial in an action brought pursuant to the Illinois Consumer Fraud statute.
Following the reasoning in Martin, the majority in Reed asserted that the jury trial
guarantee in the Illinois Constitution only applies to actions that existed under the
English common law at the time the constitution was adopted.' 65 With respect to
Reed's case, the majority determined:
In the present case.., the underlying claim is one for uninsured motorist
coverage, a remedy that did not exist at common law but instead was re-
cently devised by the legislature. The state constitutional guarantee of a
jury trial 'was not intended to guarantee a trial by jury in special or statu-
tory proceedings unknown to the common law.'
1 66
The majority's reasoning is faulty because unlike the statute in the Martin
case, the UM statute does not create a statutory cause of action unknown at the
common law. The UM statute does require insurance companies to sell UM cov-
erage, but a suit to enforce rights under an insurance policy is nothing more than
an old-fashioned action based on contract.167  Because suits based on contract
existed in the common law long before the Illinois Constitution was adopted,
Article I, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution applies to such cases, even if the
underlying contract right is based upon an insurance policy provision required by
statute. 1
68
The Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed the same issue recently in the
case of Lisanti v. Alamo Title Insurance.169 In that case, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court held that a state regulation requiring arbitration in certain cases was
unenforceable because it deprived the parties of their constitutional right to a jury
trial. 170 Nicholas and Geraldine Lisanti had purchased title insurance from Alamo
Title Insurance, and a dispute arose regarding Alamo's responsibility under the
insurance policy. 17 ' A New Mexico statute had given the superintendent of insur-
163. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
164. Martin v. Heinold Commodities, 643 N.E.2d 734 (111. 1994).
165. See id. at 758-59.
166. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1060 (11. 1999) (quoting People ex rel. Keith v.
Keith, 231 N.E.2d 387 (111. 1967) & People v. Niesman, 190 N.E. 668 (111. 1934)).
167. See Molodyh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 744 P.2d 992, 996 (Or. 1987) (holding that the jury trial right
guaranteed in the Oregon Constitution applied to cases in which a jury trial was customary at the time
of adoption, and observing that "a jury trial on factual issues concerning an insurance policy long has
been an established practice in this country").
168. It is also worth noting that although UM coverage is an invention of the twentieth century (as is
the motor vehicle), the issues to be decided in a UM case are all common law issues that have been
around for hundreds of years: negligence, proximate cause, and damages. These common law issues
determine what amount, if any, the injury victim is "legally entitled to recover" from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.
169. Lisanti v. Alamo Title Ins. of Tex., 55 P.3d 962, 968 (N.M. 2002) (holding that mandatory
arbitration regulation violated the state's constitutional right of trial by jury in a suit against title insur-
ance company for breach of contract).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 963.
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ance authority to promulgate regulations, and based on that authority, the superin-
tendent had adopted a regulation requiring arbitration of any title insurance claims
seeking less than $1,000,000.172 Also pursuant to state law, the superintendent of
insurance had drafted a uniform title insurance policy (including an arbitration
clause), and state statute required that title insurance companies could only use the
forms promulgated by the superintendent. 1
73
The Lisantis asserted that mandatory arbitration violated their right to a jury
trial under the state constitution. 174 In language very similar to that of the Illinois
Constitution, the New Mexico Constitution provides that "the right to trial by jury
as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain inviolate., 175 Com-
menting upon this provision, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained that "the
phrase 'as it has heretofore existed' refers to the right to a jury trial as that right
existed in the Territory of New Mexico immediately prior to the adoption of the
state constitution."' 176 Responding to the insurance company's argument that the
right to sue under a title insurance policy did not exist at the time the state consti-
tution was adopted, the court noted:
[W]e think that the relevant question is whether the more generally de-
scribed cause of action, such as breach of contract or breach of fiduciary
duty, was triable to a jury in 1912. The inquiry urged by Alamo is too
narrow. It would allow the evisceration of the right to a jury trial on tra-
ditional common law claims when those claims are brought in a factual
context that could not have existed in 1912. It is unreasonable, for ex-
ample, to say that no jury trial right attaches to a breach of contract claim
concerning the purchase of a computer simply because computers did not
exist when the New Mexico Constitution was adopted.
177
Paraphrasing the Supreme Court of New Mexico's statement, we can make
a parallel statement regarding UM cases in Illinois: It is unreasonable to say
that no right to a jury trial attaches to a breach of contract claim concerning
UM coverage simply because UM coverage did not exist when the Illinois
Constitution was adopted.
For the above reasons, the Illinois statutory provision requiring arbitration of
UM cases violates the jury trial right guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution, and
the statute is therefore unconstitutional.
6. Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Injury Victims of Equal Protection
The Illinois UM arbitration provision is also unconstitutional because it de-
prives UM injury victims of equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Illinois
Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 963-64.
174. Id. at 964.
175. Id. at 965. The Illinois Constitution provides: 'The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed
shall remain inviolate." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
176. Lisanti, 55 P.3d at 965.
177. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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tion. If the UM arbitration statute did not require the escape clause mechanism,
then one might argue that the statute is a rational means of obtaining prompt and
economical resolution of disputes. However, even without the escape clause, it
would still be constitutionally flawed, because the statute only applies to UM
cases. By cutting off access to the courts by UM injury victims, the statute irra-
tionally discriminates against that class of injury victims, depriving them of equal
protection of the laws.
Other injury victims in Illinois are able to vindicate their legal rights in a
court of law, using well-established rules of evidence and procedure, and with the
safeguard of an appellate review for legal errors or substantial factual errors. To
be even more specific, other victims of motorists who are insured are able to vin-
dicate their legal rights in a court of law. The injuries and damages suffered by
victims of uninsured motorists are equally serious, and equally deserving of pro-
tection by the same legal system.
B. Reed in a Larger Context: The Mandatory Arbitration Problem
1. Consensual Arbitration
Arbitration has been described as "a process in which a third party (or panel
of third parties) not a judge renders a decision in a dispute." 178 As a method of
dispute resolution, arbitration has been used since the earliest times. 179 Until the
early twentieth century, United States courts refused to enforce private agreements
to arbitrate disputes on the grounds that such agreements improperly "ousted" the
court system of its jurisdiction.'80 However, in the early 1920s, in response to
demands by business and commercial interests, New York and New Jersey passed
the first statutes making private arbitration agreements enforceable.18 1 Shortly
thereafter, in 1925, the United States Congress passed a similar statute, the
FAA, 82 with enforcement provisions and procedures originally believed to apply
only to disputes that had the potential to wind up in federal court. 83
The proponents of these early arbitration statutes were businessmen who
wanted a cheaper, faster, and more private method of resolving business-versus-
business disputes than that available in the court system. At the time, the prevail-
ing intention was that arbitration would be used by parties who had comparable
bargaining power, and who mutually agreed to its use:
The passage of the FAA was non-controversial. Virtually no interest
group or legislator rose to speak in opposition to the bill. However,
when a few persons did question whether the FAA might allow busi-
178. Jean R. Sternlight, Arbitration Class Materials 1 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
179. LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION & LAWYERS 503 (2d ed.
1997).
180. CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL 481 (2004).
181. Id. at 486.
182. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2004).
183. RISKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 179, at 516.
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nesses to use form contracts to impose arbitration on unwilling persons
such as employees or insurance customers, the advocates of the bill as-
sured Congress that this was not the intent of the legislation. 184
As Professor Jean Sternlight states: "Congress passed the FAA to enable two
or more well-informed businesses voluntarily and knowingly to select arbitration
in lieu of litigation, rather than to allow large businesses to impose binding arbi-
tration on ignorant consumers and employees through the use of form con-
tracts.
,, 185
During the following decades, support for private arbitration gained momen-
tum, and more states passed their own statutes, many modeled on the Uniform
Arbitration Act.186 Sternlight has explained that up until 1966, court decisions in
the federal and state systems remained true to the original intent that "arbitration
should be based on actual knowing consent by both parties. 18 7 Then, things
started to change. From 1967 to 1982, stating that arbitration should be favored in
the context of international commerce, the United States Supreme Court planted
the seeds for reinterpretation of the FAA. But, it did not yet rule that the FAA
applied to state courts, or that by means of the FAA, supposedly private arbitra-
tion clauses could preempt state law-or state constitutions.'
8 8
2. Consensual Arbitration Becomes Mandatory Arbitration
A significant turning point came in 1983, when the United States Supreme
Court announced that "courts should favor arbitration over litigation."'' 89 How-
ever, the courts have failed to examine the origin or constitutional implications of
such favoritism:
[Tihe Supreme Court and lower courts have frequently reiterated the con-
tention that federal policy favors arbitration over litigation, but have
never explained the source of this policy .... The Court has not made
any attempt to reconcile the supposed federal policy favoring arbitration
with the Constitution's mandate of jury trials, due process, and decisions
by life-tenured judges.' 90
184. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 180, at 487 (emphasis added).
185. Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Bind-
ing Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns,
72 TULANE L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1997) [hereinafter Stemlight, Rethinking] (discussing how so-called
"agreements" to arbitrate, as enforced by courts, may unconstitutionally deprive persons of their right
to a jury trial, a judge, and due process of law).
186. RIsKIN & WESTBROOK, supra note 179, at 515. See also Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uni-
form Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. DtSP. RESOL. 1
(2001) (commenting on the modifications made in the most recent version of the UAA).
187. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 185, at 16.
188. Id. at 16-17.
189. Id. at 17.
190. Id. at 18-19.
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In subsequent years, the Supreme Court has promoted an extraordinarily
broad application of the FAA, 19' and it has held that the FAA, in conjunction with
"private" arbitration clauses, can preempt a wide variety of state laws, many de-
signed to protect consumers and employees. 19 2 In effect, this has given businesses
the capacity to evade statutes and administrative regulations that were enacted to
protect the public.1 93 In his 1997 article, David Schwartz observes:
The Supreme Court has created a monster. With the Court's enthusiastic
approval, pre-dispute arbitration clauses-agreements to submit future
disputes to binding arbitration-have increasingly found their way into
standard form contracts of adhesion.
The doctrine of rigorous enforcement of adhesive pre-dispute arbitration
clauses-what I call "compelled arbitration"-has given large firms the
power to displace the judiciary from its role in enforcing common law
claims and statutory rights . . . . This is particularly troubling where
regulatory statutes are involved. The enforcement of adhesive arbitration
clauses allows firms to lessen the regulatory impact of statutory claims-
in short, to deregulate themselves.'
94
It gets worse. In a ruling that gives predatory contracts unprecedented power,
the Supreme Court has actually held that the FAA preempts state statutes designed
to protect consumers from hidden "agreements" to arbitrate:
[I]n Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, an 8-1 Court held that the
FAA even preempted a state's requirement that a contract containing an
arbitration clause include notification on the first page of the contract.
Allied-Bruce and Doctor's Associates, taken together, will void many
191. See id. at 19-39. In one case, the Court condescendingly noted: "The pre-New Deal Congress
that passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has
turned out to be the case." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995). The
Court held that even if the parties do not "contemplate" an interstate commerce transaction, the FAA
nevertheless applies to all transactions as broadly as "the limits of Congress' Commerce Clause
power." Curiously, however, despite the plain language of the FAA, the court provided that it does not
apply to "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce," other courts have held that it applies to "virtually all em-
ployees involved in interstate commerce." Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 185, at 19.
192. See generally Stemlight, Rethinking, supra note 185, at 19-39.
193. It is critical to understand that such an arbitration "agreement" is not limited to only changing
procedural rights by substituting an arbitration proceeding in place of a court adjudication. Such an
"agreement" can also revise the substantive rights of the parties, even eliminating some of those rights.
194. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer
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laws enacted by states to protect consumers and others from potentially
unfair arbitration ....
Thus, under current law, parties with superior bargaining power can draft
their contracts to force (or trick) people they deal with into so-called "agreements"
to arbitrate any dispute that may arise between the parties. They can thereby
"oust" the courts of their jurisdiction, "deregulate" themselves from many annoy-
ing statutes and regulations, and force upon the weaker party an arbitration system
under which legal and constitutional rights can be diminished-or extinguished.
Mandatory arbitration "agreements" can be used to give companies an advan-
tage over consumers or employees by: (1) requiring high "fees" to initiate a
claim; (2) providing that arbitration will take place in a distant location; (3) abol-
ishing certain remedies; (4) preventing class actions; (5) "rigging" the selection of
arbitrators; and (6) shortening the time limit in which to bring a claim.' 96
In exchange for whatever private system of "justice" is forced upon them,
consumers and employees can lose: (1) the right to a jury; (2) the right to a public
hearing; (3) the right to discovery of evidence in the possession of others; and (4)
the right to appeal legal errors or substantial factual errors.
197
Some supporters of mandatory arbitration argue that even if it is presented in
a form contract, it is accepted voluntarily, and that mandatory arbitration is bene-
ficial not only for the companies that use it, but also for society as a whole, as well
as individual consumers and employees.198 Among the benefits to consumers and
employees (it is argued), is the ability to resolve disputes more quickly and inex-
pensively. 199 Stephen Ware contends: "Relative to litigation, arbitration provides
opportunities for a business to save on its dispute-resolution costs. If arbitration
does, in fact, lower these costs then arbitration lowers the prices (and interest
rates) consumers pay because competition forces businesses to pass their cost-
savings on to consumers.
200
Ware's contention may be at least partially true, but not all of the supposed
cost-savings are likely to be distributed to consumers; some portion will probably
be retained by businesses to increase their profit margins. And just who should
decide which legal rights---or constitutional rights-get "processed away" so that
businesses can achieve greater profit margins? Should businesses decide that?
3. How Reed Fits in With the Mandatory Arbitration Problem
Although many of the problems with mandatory arbitration are present in the
Reed case, and in Illinois UM arbitration in general, the unique circumstances in
195. Sternlight, Rethinking, supra note 185, at 20 (internal citations omitted). In Allied-Bruce Ter-
minix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the FAA (with its power to
preempt state law) applies to all transactions as broadly as "to the limits of Congress' Commerce
Clause power."
196. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 180, at 548.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 552.
199. Id.
200. Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 89, 89 (2001).
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Reed resulted in the issues being framed quite differently. 20 1 Specifically, the big
difference is the Illinois statute.20 2
Whereas in the more general consumer context a suit contesting mandatory
arbitration might involve the issue of whether a consumer knowingly agreed to an
arbitration clause, in the Illinois UM context that is not an issue because the Illi-
nois UM statute requires the arbitration clause.20 3 With the statutory provision in
place, an insurance customer's agreement-or even knowledge that the clause is
present in the insurance policy-is not relevant.
Similarly, in the more general consumer context, consumers might argue that
an arbitration procedure designed by a business entity is unfair or unconscionable.
In Reed, the plaintiff made that argument regarding the escape clause, but the
majority rejected it, again on the grounds that the UM statute required the escape
clause.
Thus, another way to look at the Reed situation is that insurance consumers in
Illinois are one step behind those fighting mandatory arbitration in the more gen-
eral consumer context. That is, until the arbitration provision in the Illinois UM
statute is declared unconstitutional, or until it is corrected by the General Assem-
bly, that provision puts an additional barrier between UM injury victims and the
right to a jury trial, due process, and equal protection of the laws. Once that bar-
rier is broken down, Illinois insurance consumers will then be confronting the next
question, namely: should the insurance industry-with its superior bargaining
position-be allowed to force customers to give up their constitutional rights, and
submit to an arbitration system designed by the insurance industry itself?
In the national debate over mandatory arbitration, one major issue is whether
consumers voluntarily and knowingly agree to arbitration. Even if it is lurking in
the fine print, customers purchasing a product or service may have an opportunity
to discover the arbitration clause before they make their final decision. In con-
trast, the insurance customer is in a much worse position, because the insurance
customer does not get to inspect the product (the insurance contract) at the time
that he or she is purchasing it. The standard practice in the insurance industry is
for the customer to fill out an application, pay for the insurance, and then, several
days or weeks later, the insurance company mails a copy of the insurance policy
to the customer.
Commenting on "agreements" to arbitrate in insurance policies, Widiss states:
[Aln insurance policy represents neither a voluntary written agreement
by a purchaser to submit future disputes to arbitration nor a knowledge-
able waiver on behalf of all other persons who are insured (and thus may
become claimants) of the right to a judicial determination. The processes
and procedures incident to an adjudication in the courts--especially pre-
trial procedures such as discovery, the opportunity for a jury trial, and the
right to an appellate review of the trial court actions-are frequently very
important matters. Claimants should not lose these rights as a conse-
201. Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052 (111. 999)
202. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/143a (2003).
203. Id. (demanding that "[n]o policy shall be renewed, delivered, or issued for delivery ... unless it
is provided therein that any dispute.., shall be submitted to the American Arbitration Association").
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quence of an arbitration clause set forth by insurers in the midst of a
multipaged and complicated insurance policy form.20"
With respect to the problem of bargaining power, in the general consumer
context many customers dealing with a business entity may be presented with a
"take-it-or-leave-it" choice. If the consumer wants a credit card, telephone ser-
vice, or any number of other products or services, then they may have no practical
choice but to accept the so-called "agreement" to arbitrate contained in the form
contract prepared by the business entity. If a particular consumer is knowledge-
able enough to look in the fine print for an arbitration "agreement," and if that
consumer would rather avoid accepting such a condition in the contract, then that
consumer does have two other choices: either attempt to buy the product or ser-
vice from another source that does not insist on an arbitration clause, or simply
forego purchasing the product or service from any source.
As a practical matter, this may not give the consumer very much real choice,
but in contrast, the insurance customer in Illinois has no choice whatsoever. By
statute, owners of vehicles registered in Illinois are compelled to purchase auto-
mobile insurance.2 °5 Even if the Illinois statute did not require arbitration of UM
cases, the insurance customer would still be compelled by the state to purchase
insurance, and-because the insurance industry clearly favors arbitration over the
courts-insurance companies probably would still impose arbitration by means of
their policies. Even if the Illinois statute did not require arbitration of UM cases,
unless legislation is enacted to protect insurance consumers, the end result may be
that they will still wind up with an arbitration clause, this time forced upon them
by the superior bargaining position of the insurance industry.
Finally, perhaps the most important thing to understand about how Illinois
UM cases fit in with the general problem of mandatory arbitration is they do not
have to fit in. To put it another way, unlike mandatory arbitration imposed by
other business entities, states do have the power to prevent insurance companies
from imposing mandatory arbitration on their state-compelled customers; how
states can accomplish this is described in the next section.
C. Recommended Action
For the reasons set forth above in Part IV, when it next has a proper case be-
fore it, the Illinois Supreme Court should reverse Reed and hold: (1) that the Illi-
nois statutory provision requiring the escape clause is unconstitutional; and (2)
that the Illinois statutory provision requiring arbitration of UM cases is unconsti-
tutional.
However, judicial action alone will not be enough to protect insurance con-
sumers and injury victims; legislative action is also imperative. The reason for
this is that even if these statutory provisions are declared unconstitutional, the
insurance industry would still attempt to impose mandatory arbitration through
their insurance policies.
204. WIDISS, supra note 4, § 23.15.
205. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57-601 (2002).
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Therefore, the Illinois General Assembly should amend the Arbitration Act
and/or the Insurance Code to accomplish the following: (1) prohibit insurance
policies from requiring arbitration; and (2) allow arbitration of insurance disputes
only when both parties knowingly agree to arbitrate after a dispute has arisen.
Statutes which accomplish this-without impairing the ability of other busi-
nesses to use arbitration clauses reached with true agreement-are already in exis-
tence in several states. Missouri, for example, achieves this by means of its Uni-
form Arbitration Act, which declares that any arbitration agreement "between the
parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.,,206 However, the Missouri
legislature curtails the scope of the act by providing that "contracts of insurance
and contracts of adhesion" are exempted and courts may reject enforcement of an
arbitration clause in those circumstances.0 7
In comparison, Georgia, while requiring insurers to include a UM provision
in all policies "issued or delivered" within the state, prohibits the imposition of
arbitration in UM cases by this provision within the insurance code:
No endorsement or provisions shall contain a provision requiring arbitra-
tion of any claim arising under any endorsement or provisions, nor may
anything be required of the insured, subject to the other provisions of the
policy or contract, except the establishment of legal liability; nor shall the
insured be restricted or prevented, in any manner, from employing legal
208
counsel or instituting legal proceedings.
Neither of these statutes prohibit arbitration if both parties knowingly agree to
arbitrate after a dispute has arisen. Arbitration can have advantages over litiga-
tion, but the law should not allow a party with stronger bargaining power to force
it upon another.
Either the Missouri or Georgia approach would work in Illinois. But what-
ever approach is used, it is important that any statutory solution be specifically
directed toward the business of insurance, in order that it may rely upon the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to protect it from federal preemption.209 Under current
law, a generally-phrased state statute prohibiting arbitration would be preempted
by the FAA, but statutes that "regulate the business of insurance" are not subject
to such preemption because "the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . gives state laws
regulating the business of insurance primacy over federal law. 210
For example, in a 2001 case, the Missouri statute quoted above was chal-
lenged by an insurance company seeking to enforce an arbitration clause in its
206. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2002) (regarding the validity of arbitration agreements and excep-
tions).
207. Id.
208. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11 (2004).
209. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015. For a good example of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in action, see
Ciccarelli v. Blue Cross of Cal., 2003 WL 150045, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Ciccarelli court
explains, "An act of Congress may not be construed to 'invalidate, impair, or supercede' a state law
enacted 'for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance' unless the federal act 'specifically
relates to the business of insurance."' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Smith v. Pacificare Behav-
ioral Health of Cal., 113 Cal Rptr. 2d 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
210. JERRY, supra note 3, §§ 84, 21. See also Lamson, supra note 6, at 248-51.
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policy. The company argued that the FAA preempted Missouri's anti-arbitration
provision, but the federal appeals court upheld the Missouri statute, in accord with
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
211
Finally, any legislative solution in Illinois should consider a few specifics
about how UM cases would be handled in the court system. As mentioned above,
it would not be difficult for the courts to re-assume jurisdiction of these cases
because the issues involved are the same issues that are involved in other auto
collision cases, which the courts handle on a daily basis. But whether the unin-
sured driver is known or unknown, if suit is commenced against that driver there
must be a mechanism by which the UM insurance company can receive notice of
the suit, and an opportunity to defend, either in the name of the uninsured driver
or its own name.
The Georgia UM statute contains several provisions designed to give the in-
surance company adequate notice, particularly taking into account the fact that a
defendant's lack of insurance may not be discovered until litigation is underway.
Regarding service of summons on the UM insurance company, the Georgia statute
also provides: "In any case arising under this Code section where service upon an
insurance company is prescribed .... The return of service upon the insurance
company shall in no case appear upon the original pleadings in such case.' 2 2
This latter portion seems intended to allow the insurance company to remain in
the background, and thus avoid the "deep pockets" problem.
With respect to the insurance company's right to defend, the Georgia UM
statute also provides:
In the case of a known owner or operator of such vehicle, either or both
of whom are named as a defendant in such action, the insurance company
issuing the policy [containing UM coverage] shall have the right to file
pleading and take other action allowable by law in the name of either the
known owner or operator or both or itself.
213
If either the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damages
is unknown, an action may be instituted against the unknown defendant
as "John Doe," and a copy of the action and all pleading thereto shall be
served as prescribed by law upon the insurance company issuing the pol-
icy [containing UM coverage] as though the insurance company were ac-
tually named as a party defendant; and the insurance company shall have
the right to file pleadings and take other action allowable by law in the
name of "John Doe" or itself.
214
211. Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. West, 267 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
FAA was "inverse-preempted" under McCarran-Ferguson Act, by Missouri Arbitration Act that pro-
hibited insurance contracts from using "pre-dispute" arbitration clauses).
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V. CONCLUSION
Most states require owners of vehicles to purchase liability insurance to pro-
tect others they may injure, but there will always be irresponsible or insolvent
drivers who fail to comply with the law. When a driver with no insurance injures
another driver-or a passenger-or a pedestrian-UM coverage becomes an im-
portant method by which the injury victim can be compensated for medical bills,
lost earnings, and other damages suffered from the impact.
When an injury victim must make a claim against their own insurance com-
pany for uninsured motorist benefits, it is important to remember that they have
paid a premium-perhaps for several years-in order to have this protection. And
when they present a claim for benefits, it is not fair-and it is not constitutional-
to treat those injury victims as second-class citizens by forcing them into a system
that deprives them of access to the courts, deprives them of the right to a jury trial,
and deprives them of the other protections of the law that other injury victims are
entitled to and receive every day. And it is especially appalling to force those
injury victims into an arbitration system in which, if they lose, it is binding-but if
they win, their insurance company gets a new trial.
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